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1  Introduction
In recent years electronic trading systems proliferated in the world’s financial markets. Screen
trading systems are said to have a variety of specific advantages. They offer lower operating
costs, remote access to the system and higher transparency (see, e.g., Domowitz / Steil 1998).
It has even been argued that the survival of floor trading systems may be attributable to vested
interests rather than to specific advantages offered by these trading systems (Domowitz 1993).
Although these arguments may seem convincing, empirical evidence on the relative
advantages of floor and electronic trading systems is certainly needed before far-reaching
policy implications are to be given. The objective of the present paper is to contribute to this
evidence. We focus on the aspect of price discovery which is central to the operation of a
financial market. Our research design makes use of a distinguishing feature of the German
stock market, namely, the co-existence of two liquid markets for the same stocks.
1 Since
1991, a fully electronic trading system (IBIS, in November 1997 replaced by XETRA)
operates parallel to the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. This allows us to directly compare the price
discovery process in floor and screen trading systems.
The present paper is related to previous work on price discovery in floor and electronic trading
systems. Both Grünbichler / Longstaff / Schwartz (1994) and Stucki / Wasserfallen (1994)
compare a floor-based stock market to an electronic derivatives exchange. Grünbichler /
Longstaff / Schwartz (1994) find that the screen-traded future leads the stock market whereas
Stucki / Wasserfallen (1994) report that screen-traded equity options lag the stock market. The
Bund futures contract, traded on the floor of the LIFFE and in the electronic DTB (now
                                                
1 In fact, there are nine rather than two markets because seven regional exchanges exist besides the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange and the electronic trading system. Given their low market shares, we do not consider the
regional exchanges in this paper. See Kehr (1997), Kirchner (1999) and Schmidt / Iversen / Treske (1993) for
a treatment of this issue.2
EUREX), has been analyzed in several papers (Breedon / Holland 1998, Fraser-Jenkins 1998,
Kofman / Moser 1997, Martens 1998, Shyy / Lee 1995). Although the conclusions reached in
these papers differ (partly due to different sample periods), the balance of the results indicates
that the electronic market leads the floor. It should be noted, however, that the electronic
market is the home market. Therefore, it may be the price-leader for reasons other than the
trading mechanism.
The German stock market with its unique feature of parallel floor and screen trading has also
been subject to empirical investigation. Kirchner / Schlag (1998) document that the prices in
the electronic trading system adjust to the price established in the opening auction on the
floor. Both Freihube / Theissen (2001) and Kempf / Korn (1998) compare the two markets
using stock index data. Kempf / Korn (1998) find that the integration between the electronic
trading system and the (equally electronic) futures market is higher than the degree of
integration between the floor and the futures market. Freihube / Theissen (2001) document
that the screen-based XETRA system contributes more to the price discovery process than the
floor for the blue-chip index DAX. The reverse is true, however, for the mid-cap index
MDAX.
Stock-level analyses are provided by Bühler / Grünbichler / Schmidt (1995), Kehr (1997) and
Kirchner (1999). The results do not support the hypothesis that one of the markets is the
leader in the price discovery process. These papers are closely related to ours. There is,
however, an important difference. All three papers use transactions data.
2 This entails the
problem of restructuring the data in a way that is consistent with the implicit assumption of
synchronicity. A second problem lies in the fact that the number of observations is rather low
                                                
2 Data on bid and ask quotes is not available on a regular basis for the German stock market.3
for less liquid stocks. Consequently, both Bühler / Grünbichler / Schmidt (1995) and Kirchner
(1999) restrict their analysis to a small number of liquid stocks (four and eight, respectively).
In the present paper we use data on both transaction prices and bid and ask quotes. This allows
us to construct an equally-spaced and (almost
3) synchronous data set. Further, since quote
changes are more frequent than transactions, we are able to include a larger number of stocks
than some of the previous studies. This allows us to analyze the cross-sectional determinants
of the relative contributions of the two markets to the process of price discovery.
We quantify the contributions of the two markets to the process of price discovery using two
different approaches. The first consists in estimating the information shares of the two
markets as proposed by Hasbrouck (1995). Our second approach builds on work by Schwarz /
Szakmary (1994) and Gonzalo / Granger (1995). Schwarz / Szakmary (1994) propose a simple
measure of the contributions to price discovery that can be obtained directly from the
estimated coefficients of the error correction model. We give a formal justification for this
measure. Gonzalo / Granger (1995) document how the common long memory components
can be identified from a system of cointegrated variables. We show that the weights with
which the time series enter the common long memory component are equal to the
contributions to price discovery as defined by Schwarz / Szakmary (1994).
The main findings can be summarized as follows. Both markets contribute to price discovery.
There is bidirectional Granger causality, and prices from both markets adjust to deviations
from the long-run equilibrium. We apply both measures of the contributions to price discovery
and find that they are very similar and highly correlated. Our results thus support the
application of the simpler measure.
                                                
3 As will be pointed out in detail below, there are instances when no valid quotes exist on the floor. In these
cases we use the last available quote midpoint.4
The contributions of the two competing trading systems to the process of price discovery are
almost equal when transaction prices are used for the estimation. Models based on quote
midpoints, on the other hand, indicate that the electronic trading system has a larger share in
the price discovery process. An additional cross-sectional analysis reveals that the
contributions of the two trading systems to price discovery are positively related to their
market shares.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical arguments in
favor of better price discovery in floor or screen-based trading systems. Section 3 offers a
brief description of the microstructure of the German stock market and describes our data set.
In section 4 we describe our methodology. Section 5 documents the results of the error
correction models. Section 6 concludes.
2  Theory
Floor and electronic trading systems differ with respect to a number of characteristics which
are related to the speed of price discovery. Screen trading systems are less costly to operate
and may, therefore, offer lower bid-ask spreads. The possibility of remote access may increase
the number of traders and thereby also lead to an increase in liquidity. The magnitude of the
transaction costs determines whether a trader can profitably trade on a given piece of
information. Therefore, price discovery should be faster in screen-based trading systems.
Three further arguments corroborate this prediction. Orders can be entered faster into an
electronic system and the execution of an order is immediate. Further, it is easier to
disseminate market information, thereby increasing the transparency of the market and the
information available to the traders. Greater pre-trade transparency allows to more accurately
estimate the price impact of a trade. Finally, the anonymity of most existing electronic trading5
systems makes it easier for informed traders to exploit their informational advantage.
Therefore, the screen trading system is likely to attract informed traders.
These arguments yield the prediction that the electronic trading system impounds new
information faster into prices. When interpreting this, one important point should be noted.
The arguments implying faster price discovery in screen-based trading systems are partly
based on the presumption that it is easier for informed traders to exploit their informational
advantage. This clearly imposes adverse selection costs on other traders. It is a priori unclear
whether these costs overcompensate the advantages offered by electronic trading systems.
Theissen (2001), also using data from the German stock market, finds that the adverse
selection component of the spread is higher in the electronic trading system than on the floor.
In spite of this, effective spreads are lower for liquid stocks but are higher for less liquid
stocks than effective spreads on the floor. This suggests that the higher adverse selection costs
overcompensate the advantages of screen-based trading systems for less liquid stocks whereas
the advantages outweigh the costs for the more liquid stocks.
It should thus be kept in mind that faster price discovery does not necessarily imply higher
overall market quality. Resolving the issue addressed here – the trade-off between
informational efficiency and liquidity – is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper.
3  Market structure and data
The floor of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) operates in a way similar to the floor of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The equivalent of the specialist is the amtlicher
Kursmakler (Makler in the sequel). He conducts the three daily call auctions – an opening
auction, a second auction at noon
4 and the closing auction – and has exclusive access to the
                                                
4 The description documents the organization of trading during the sample period.6
orders in the limit order book. He is allowed but, unlike the NYSE specialist, not obliged to
trade for his own account. Orders are either routed electronically into the book or are
communicated verbally on the floor. Based on the orders in the book and his willingness to
trade as principal, the Makler announces bid and ask prices. These are entered into an
electronic system and are called Pretrades. Although no quoted depth is publicly announced,
the depth at the quotes appears to be reasonably high. This is evidenced by two observations.
First, transactions at prices outside the quoted spread rarely occur. They account for only 0.9%
of the transactions in our data set. Second, the average transaction size on the floor is larger
than the average transaction size in the electronic trading system for all but one of the sample
stocks.
The Pretrades are deleted automatically from the system after each transaction. This has two
important implications for our empirical analysis. First, valid quotes do not always exist
because it takes some time to re-enter quotes after a transaction. Second, since quotes have to
be re-entered after each transaction, they are unlikely to become stale. Further, the incentive to
quote a wide spread in order to avoid frequent re-posting is reduced – quotes have to be re-
entered anyway.
As is the case on the NYSE, transactions may, and often do, occur at prices inside the spread.
Approximately 40% of the transactions in our data set benefit from price improvement, 20%
occur at a price that equals the quote midpoint.
IBIS, in operation from April 1991 to November 1997, was an anonymous, fully electronic
open limit order book. The best bids and offers, together with the quantity bid or offered, were
displayed on the trading screens. In order to trigger a transaction a trader had to explicitly
accept a limit order displayed on the screen. This feature characterizes IBIS as a “hit-and-
take” system. There were no designated market makers in IBIS. There has, however, been a7
considerable amount of voluntary market making. The Maklers were allowed to participate in
IBIS trading.
Trading hours in IBIS extended from 8:30 am to 5 pm and were thus considerably longer than
the trading hours on the floor (10:30 am to 1:30 pm). Throughout the paper we only use data
from the three hours of parallel trading.
The minimum tick size is very low (DM 0.01 [0.05] for stocks trading at prices below [above]
DM 100) and is equal in both trading systems. We therefore do not consider price discreteness
to be an important issue.
Our data set contains time-stamped transaction prices, trading volumes and best bid and best
ask quotes from both trading systems. This data was provided by Deutsche Börse AG for the
30 stocks which comprise the index DAX. The sample covers 42 trading days in the months
June and July 1997.
5
Insert Table 1 about here
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample stocks. The average trading volume in the
three hours of parallel trading ranges from DM 132.8 million to DM 9.1 million. Similarly,
the average daily number of transactions ranges from 335 to 36. The average effective spread
ranges from 0.084% to 0.407% on the floor and from 0.095% to 0.544% in IBIS.
The market shares of the two trading systems in terms of trading volume are almost equal
(unweighted average of the IBIS market share 51.6%). There is, however, a tendency for the
market share of IBIS to be higher for more liquid stocks. If market share is measured in terms
of the number of transactions, the market share of the electronic trading system is higher
(unweighted average 62.9%). This indicates that the average transaction size is slightly larger8
on the floor. Finally, there is a tendency for effective spreads to be lower in IBIS for the most




If price discovery is faster in one market, returns on this market should lead the returns on the
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where r denotes log returns, t indexes time and f and s characterize returns from the floor and
the screen trading system, respectively. When the coefficients 
f
t g  are (as a group)
significantly different from zero, returns in the electronic trading system Granger-cause
returns on the floor. Similarly, floor returns Granger-cause the returns in the electronic trading
system when the coefficients 
s
t g  are different from zero. If both sets of parameters are
different from zero, the process of price discovery is interdependent, i.e. there is bidirectional
Granger causality.
Hasbrouck (1995) points out that the VAR specification is inappropriate when the prices in
the two markets are cointegrated. In this case, the representation theorem (Engle / Granger
                                                                                                                                                        
5 Two of the 44 trading days in the sample months (July 21
st and July 23
rd) had to be discarded. On both days,
the exchange’s computer facilities broke down and trading had to be suspended several times.
6 For transactions on the floor an additional commission (the “Courtage”) has to be paid. The regular rate for
the stocks in our sample is 0.04% of the transaction value. Reduced rates apply for floor brokers (Freimakler)
and some banks. This should be taken into account when comparing spreads from the two trading systems.
See Theissen (2001) for details.9
1987) posits that the model has to be augmented with an error correction term. This results in
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where p denotes the log price. Generally, the cointegrating relation describes the long-run
equilibrium of the system. In the present case, the two time series under scrutiny are two
prices for the same stock established in two parallel markets. In equilibrium, the prices should
be equal. The resulting long-run equilibrium is given by  0
fs
TT pp -= . The cointegrating
vector is thus [1; -1]. The coefficients 
f d  and 
s d  indicate how the system responds to
deviations from the long-run equilibrium. If the price on the floor is higher than the price in
IBIS we would expect a negative price change on the floor and / or a positive price change in
IBIS and vice versa. We thus expect  0
f d <  and  0
s d > .
An important aspect of the analysis is to quantify the contribution of the two markets to the
process of price discovery. Two methods, one due to Hasbrouck (1995) and one due to
Schwarz / Szakmary (1994), have been proposed. We will discuss both measures briefly.
Information Shares (Hasbrouck 1995)
The information share relates the contribution of an individual market’s innovation to the total
innovation of the common efficient price. The latter is identified as the common trend in the
common trend representation of the model (Stock / Watson 1988). If the markets’ innovations
were uncorrelated (i.e., if the variance-covariance matrix W were diagonal), the information











where c is the common row vector of the impact matrix in the common trend representation.
7
In practice, the innovations will be correlated.
8 Hasbrouck (1995) proposed to triangularize
the variance-covariance matrix. A Cholesky factorization is used to obtain the lower triangular









Due to the nature of the Cholesky decomposition this procedure maximizes the information
share of the first market and, consequently, minimizes the share of the second market. By
permuting the order of the markets, upper and lower bounds for each market’s information
share are obtained. Following the literature, we use the mean of the upper and the lower bound
as a unique measure of a market’s information share.
Martens (1998) shows that, in the case of two markets with a cointegrating vector (1; -1), the
information shares for markets 1 and 2 are given by
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where x is an arbitrary constant. The information shares are then given by
                                                
7 See Hasbrouck (1995, p. 1181) and Martens (1998, p. 249).
8 Hasbrouck (1995) points out that the correlation is negatively related to the sampling frequency. We address
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Common factor weights
The coefficients 
f d  and 
s d  in the error correction model (2) determine the permanent effect
that a shock to one of the variables has on the system. Schwarz / Szakmary (1994) therefore
proposed to use the relative magnitude of the coefficients 
f d  and 
s d  to assess the














If price discovery occurs in IBIS only,  0 q = ; if price discovery occurs exclusively on the
floor,  1 q = . If both trading systems contribute equally to the process of price discovery,
0.5 q = .
The measure has, as it appears, been developed on intuitive grounds. However, a formal
justification can be derived from the work of Gonzalo / Granger (1995). The common trend
representation of the system can be written as
1 tt t =+ PA fP % (9)
where  t P  is the vector of log prices, A1 satisfies  0 = 1 
$  where b is the cointegrating
vector, t f  is the common long-memory component and  t P %  is an I(0) component. Gonzalo /
                                                








. This is equivalent to the definition given in the text as
long as the coefficients  ,
fs dd  have the expected sign, i.e.,  0, 0
sf dd >< .12
Granger (1995) impose two restrictions that allow to identify the common long-memory
component  t f :
10
1.  t f  is a linear combination of the series Pt and
2.  t f  and  t P %  form a permanent-transitory decomposition of Pt where the specific definition
of the decomposition is given by Gonzalo / Granger (1995, p. 28).
The long-memory component is then defined up to multiplication with a constant by
= tt f 3 % (10)
where  %  is defined as before, i.e., is a vector orthogonal to d. From this it follows that the
weights with which the series enter the common long-memory component are defined by the





























From (2) we have  12 ;
fs dddd == . It thus follows that  () 12 ;1 ww qq == - . The measure
proposed by Schwarz / Szakmary (1994) thus measures the weight with which the series enter
the common long memory component as identified by Gonzalo / Granger (1995).
                                                
10 Ding et al. (1999) and Harris / McInish / Wood (1997) develop a method to estimate the long-memory factor
and derive a measure of the contributions to price discovery from this estimate.13
With the information share and the common factor weights we have two alternative measures
of a market’s contribution to price discovery. One important objective of our paper is to
compare these measures.
Estimation procedure
Transactions do not occur at regular intervals, nor do transactions in the two parallel trading
systems occur simultaneously. The data set thus has to be re-organized prior to estimation. We
subdivided our sample into intervals of equal length and, for each interval, recorded the last
available price and quote midpoint. Overnight returns were excluded from the estimation. We
chose two interval lengths, one minute and five minutes.
11 Using quote midpoints in addition
to transaction prices is potentially advantageous because bid and ask quotes are (almost
12)
permanently available. Quote data thus allows to construct an (almost) simultaneous data set.
In a first step we test the order of integration of the log price series. Augmented Dickey Fuller
tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root slightly more frequently than expected. We obtain
12% rejections at the 5% level of significance.
13 For the first-differenced series the null
hypothesis of a unit root was rejected in each case at the 1% level of significance.
We next tested for cointegration. We used the likelihood ratio test procedure proposed by
Johansen (1988, 1991). The results indicate that the time series from the floor and IBIS are
cointegrated. The order of the error correction model was determined using the Schwarz
information criterion. The appropriate lag lengths lie between 1 and 4 for the 5-minute series
                                                
11 There are alternative ways to organize the data set. Harris et al. (1995) propose to construct a matched sample
of transactions. This procedure has the advantage that the matching algorithm can be chosen such that the
delay between the observations from the two markets is minimized. The disadvantage is that the observations
are not equally spaced, rather, the sample is formed in transaction time. Given that we use quote data, we can
construct an almost synchronous sample and therefore prefer the procedure described in the text.
12 As outlined above, bid and ask quotes on the floor are deleted after each transaction. Although new quotes are
usually posted within a couple of seconds, there are instances where no valid quotes exist on the floor. In
these cases we use the last available quote midpoint in the estimation.
13 We have eight time series for each stock: 1-minute interval and 5-minute interval series of prices and quote
midpoints from the floor and IBIS. The total number of tests is thus 240.14
and between 1 and 20 for the 1-minute series. As outlined above we use the pre-specified
cointegrating vector [1; -1] in the estimation.
5  Results
We present the results in three steps. The first subsection describes the results of the error
correction model. In the second subsection we compare the information shares and the
common factor weights. The last subsection analyzes the cross-sectional determinants of the
contributions to price discovery.
ECM results
Table 2 shows the results for the one-minute intervals. They clearly indicate that both markets
contribute to the process of price discovery. We find bi-directional Granger causality
irrespective of whether the estimation is based on transaction prices or quote midpoints. The
IBIS factor weight averages 0.534 with a minimum of 0.342 and a maximum of 0.726 when
the estimation is based on transaction prices. The information share yields similar results. The
average information share for IBIS is 0.570 with a minimum of 0.301 and a maximum of
0.791. The information shares are estimated precisely, i.e., the differences between the upper
and the lower bounds are reasonably low, averaging 0.21.
In order to analyze whether IBIS contributes more to the process of price discovery we tested
whether the average factor weight and the average information share is different from 0.5
using both a t-test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon test. The null hypothesis of a mean (t-test)
and median (Wilcoxon test), respectively, of 0.5 is rejected at the 10% level for the common
factor weights and at the 5% level for the information shares. The results are thus consistent
with the hypothesis that IBIS has the leading role in the price discovery process. The
differences between IBIS and the floor are, however, surprisingly small.
Insert Table 2 about here15
The results obtained when estimating the model based on quote midpoints are more favorable
for the electronic trading system. The average factor weight is 0.649 with a minimum of 0.400
and a maximum of 0.886. Similarly, the average information share is 0.655 (minimum 0.360,
maximum 0.893). Both averages are significantly different from 0.5. A possible explanation
for the difference between the results based on transaction prices and quote midpoints is the
different quotation activity in the two trading systems. On the floor, only the Makler posts bid
and ask prices.
14 In IBIS, on the other hand, limit order traders compete with each other.
Consequently, the quotation activity is significantly higher and the quote midpoint changes
more frequently. The market share of IBIS in terms of published quotes is 77.8% as compared
to a 63.3% share in the number of transactions. Our estimation results indicate that these
quote changes in IBIS convey information that is used by the Makler when he sets his own
quotes.
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 3 shows the results based on the five-minute intervals. They are qualitatively similar.
We again find bi-directional Granger causality and both the common factor weights and the
information shares indicate that both markets contribute to price discovery. The average
values for the transaction price model are 0.513 for the factor weights and 0.514 for the
information shares. A t-test and a Wilcoxon test indicate that these average values are not
significantly different from 0.5. It should be noted, however, that the information shares are
estimated unprecisely as indicated by a very large range between the upper and the lower
bound (average range 0.63).
15
                                                
14 The Makler has to change the quoted prices when new limit orders are submitted that narrow the spread.
However. as documented by Freihube et al. (1999), the role of limit orders in the process of liquidity
provision on the floor is limited.
15 As noted in section 4, only upper and lower bounds for the information shares can be given when the
innovations in the two markets are correlated. Hasbrouck (1995) points out that the precision with which the
information shares are estimated is related to the sampling frequency. The intuition is that the longer is the16
The results are again more favorable for IBIS when the quote midpoint model is considered.
The average values of the factor weights and the information shares are 0.650 and 0.565,
respectively, and both averages are significantly larger than 0.5 at better than the 5% level. In
four out of the 30 cases the coefficient on the error correction term is not significantly
different from zero in the IBIS equation. This indicates that, in these four cases, quotes on the
floor adjust to deviations between the trading systems whereas quotes in IBIS do not.
Information shares versus common factor weights
The results in the preceding subsection already indicated that the common factor weights and
the information shares lead to qualitatively similar conclusions. We now turn to a more
detailed comparison of these two measures of price discovery.
Insert Table 4 about here
Table 4 shows the means of both measures and their correlation. The mean IBIS factor weight
and the mean IBIS information share are very similar and are not significantly different from
each other in three out of four cases. The only exception is the 5-minute quote midpoint
model. Note that this is the model for which the information shares are the least precise. This
is evidenced by an average range between upper and lower bound of 0.687.
The correlation between the factor weights and the information shares is very high. It amounts
to 0.972 for the 1-minute transaction price model, 0.967 for the 1-minute quote midpoint
model and 0.947 for the 5-minute transaction price model. The model estimated from 5-
                                                                                                                                                        
sampling interval, the higher is the probability that simultaneous price changes are observed in the two
markets. This leads to higher correlation of the innovations which, in turn, translates into larger differences
between the upper and the lower bound for the information share. Our results are consistent with this
intuition. The differences between the upper and lower bounds are unanimously higher for the 5-minute
models as compared to the 1-minute models. Further, the differences tend to be higher for more liquid stocks
(note that the stocks in Table 2 and Table 3 are sorted by trading volume in descending order). More liquid
stocks have higher transaction frequencies and, consequently, a given interval length is associated with higher
contemporaneous correlation of the innovations.17
minute quote midpoints yields the lowest correlation. The correlation coefficient of 0.831 is
however, still strongly significant at usual levels.
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here
Figure 1 and Figure 2 visualize the results for the 1-minute models. It is apparent that the
common factor weights and the information shares are very similar. Given that the factor
weights are both theoretically well founded and easy to calculate, our results give strong
support to the application of this simple measure.
Cross-sectional determinants of the common factor weights
Our data set allows us to address the question of what determines the contributions of the two
trading systems to the process of price discovery. Since, as documented in the preceding
subsection, both measures of these contributions are very similar, we restrict the analysis to
the common factor weights.
The stocks in Table 2 and Table 3 are sorted by trading volume in descending order. It appears
that the common factor weights of IBIS are positively related to the trading volume. This is
corroborated by a correlation analysis. The correlation between (1 - q) and the log of trading
volume is 0.699 for the 1-minute transaction price model, 0.553 for the 1-minute quote
midpoint model, 0.421 for the 5-minute transaction price model and 0.231 for the 5-minute
quote midpoint model. All but the last coefficient are significantly different from zero at the
5% level.
Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here
Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the results. The figures show the IBIS common factor weights
for all four models for stocks sorted by trading volume. The IBIS factor weights are larger
when the estimation is based on quote midpoints (thus indicating greater contribution of IBIS18
to price discovery) and the weights show a tendency to be smaller for stocks with lower
trading volume.
In order to obtain more detailed insight into the cross-sectional determinants of the
contributions to price discovery we perform a regression analysis. The dependent variable is
the IBIS common factor weight (1 - q). There are several variables that may have explanatory
power for the factor weights. First, it was found in previous studies that the market with the
larger market share contributes more to price discovery.
16 Therefore, we use the market share
of IBIS as an explanatory variable. Second, as outlined in section 2, smaller spreads enable
investors to exploit smaller pieces of information. We therefore include the difference
between the effective spread on the floor and the effective spread in IBIS on the right-hand
side.
Finally, the amount of informed trading may be related to the contributions to price discovery.
We use the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as a proxy for the amount of
informed trading. We estimate the adverse selection component using a two-way
decomposition similar to the one proposed by Huang / Stoll (1996). The difference between
the adverse selection components is then included as an explanatory variable. To avoid
multicollinearity we do not include effective spreads and adverse selection component at the
same time but rather estimate two separate models. The two models are thus
() () 01 , 2 , , 1
ee
i IBIS i floor i IBIS i i aa M S a s s qe -= + + - +
and
() () 01 , 2 , , 1
aa
i IBIS i floor i IBIS i i bb M S b s s qh -= + + - +
                                                
16 An exception is Martens (1998). He analyzes the Bund futures contracts traded on the LIFFE and the DTB. In
low volatility periods the market share of the LIFFE is larger whereas the contribution to price discovery is
smaller.19
where  IBIS MS  is the market share of IBIS, measured in terms of DM trading volume, s
e
denotes the effective spread and s
a denotes the adverse selection component. i indexes the
sample stocks. We expect that (1 - q) is larger (i.e., the contribution of IBIS to price discovery
is larger) the larger the market share of IBIS and the larger the spread on the floor relative to
the spread in IBIS. We thus expect the coefficients a1, a2, b1 and b2 to be positive.
Insert Table 5 about here
We estimate both equations using the factor weights obtained from the 1-minute and 5-minute
price and quote midpoint models. The results are presented in Table 5. The explanatory power
is higher for the models based on prices as compared to the models based on quote midpoints
and is higher for the 1-minute models as compared to the 5-minute models.
The intercept is larger in the models based on quote midpoints. This is consistent with our
earlier finding that the IBIS factor weights are larger when the estimation is based on quote
midpoints. The coefficient on the IBIS market share has the expected sign in all eight cases. It
is significant at the 5% level or better in all models based on prices but in only one of the
quote midpoint models. The coefficient on the spread differential also has the expected sign. It
is significant, however, only in the 1-minute transaction price model. In the 1-minute midpoint
model the coefficient is significantly different from zero only at the 10% level. The coefficient
on the difference in the adverse selection components always has the expected positive sign
but is never significantly different from zero.
The results thus indicate that the contribution to price discovery is positively related to the
market share. The relation between the relative size of the bid-ask spread and the contribution
to price discovery has the expected sign but is, at best, weak.20
6  Summary
In the present paper we exploit a unique institutional feature of the German stock market,
namely, the co-existence of floor and screen trading, to analyze the price discovery in
traditional floor-based and electronic exchanges.
We estimate error correction models based on transaction prices and quote midpoints. The
results confirm the finding that both systems contribute to price discovery. The contributions
are almost equal when the estimation is based on transaction prices. The model based on
quotes midpoints, on the other hand, leads to the conclusion that the electronic trading system
contributes more to price discovery. This is consistent with the higher quotation activity in
IBIS.
We analyze two different measures of the contributions to price discovery. The first is the
information share proposed by Hasbrouck (1995), the second is a simple measure calculated
from the coefficients of the ECM and first proposed by Schwarz / Szakmary (1994). We give
a theoretical foundation for this measure by showing that it is equal to the weights with which
the time series under scrutiny enter the common long memory component as defined by
Gonzalo / Granger (1995). We therefore term this measure the common factor weight. Our
analysis reveals that the information share and the common factor weights are very similar.
Given that the common factor weights are easier to estimate, our results thus support the
application of this measure.
An analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of the contributions to price discovery reveals
that the contributions of the trading systems are positively related to their market shares. The
relation between the relative size of the bid-ask spread and the contribution to price discovery
is, at best, weak.21
We document a positive relation between the total trading volume and the contribution of
IBIS to price discovery. Taken together, the results thus imply that, first, floor trading systems
are not necessarily inferior to electronic open limit order books in terms of contributions to
price discovery and that, second, the advantages of electronic trading systems are more
pronounced for more liquid stocks.22
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics














DBK 132.830 61.18 335.21 61.382 0.084 0.100
DAI 128.011 63.37 252.03 73.840 0.102 0.097
SIE 119.023 61.10 307.16 64.631 0.093 0.095
VOW 101.821 56.95 225.40 66.083 0.137 0.149
ALV 72.614 53.16 160.50 62.798 0.148 0.212
BAY 69.470 53.36 280.17 51.815 0.096 0.133
VEB 66.953 60.43 163.88 70.509 0.112 0.122
BAS 64.289 56.26 217.95 66.038 0.127 0.136
COB 61.701 48.89 209.45 66.660 0.159 0.151
HFA 59.105 59.02 206.86 59.910 0.089 0.157
DTE 47.916 57.19 195.38 70.376 0.159 0.144
DRB 46.845 45.62 128.81 63.862 0.170 0.170
MMW 44.021 47.29 97.19 47.700 0.170 0.236
SAP3 38.041 52.25 158.27 58.312 0.232 0.245
MUV2 32.147 44.08 59.79 54.006 0.260 0.401
BMW 31.479 56.92 75.43 73.578 0.267 0.267
BVM 30.200 48.74 83.83 65.859 0.269 0.305
BHW 29.191 52.16 113.14 55.135 0.152 0.241
THY 28.500 55.02 77.03 73.075 0.259 0.216
RWE 26.327 49.16 80.45 62.685 0.145 0.202
SCH 25.987 48.24 116.19 48.670 0.205 0.297
VIA 23.465 52.18 79.12 65.748 0.152 0.191
MEO 21.427 51.03 74.33 74.855 0.292 0.336
PRS 19.837 42.88 80.55 58.349 0.184 0.311
LHA 18.485 45.93 102.64 66.923 0.238 0.270
KAR 14.304 49.31 61.69 64.759 0.260 0.348
DEG 11.253 47.89 55.07 65.807 0.335 0.430
LIN 10.607 37.32 36.98 55.435 0.407 0.544
HEN3 9.566 50.21 50.24 63.416 0.242 0.351
MAN 9.107 41.77 46.76 55.304 0.236 0.35026
Table 2: Summary results of the error correction model – one minute intervals
A “+” indicates that the respective coefficient (error correction, lag coefficients in equations with one lag) or group of coefficients (lag coefficients in equations with more than one
lag) is significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. (1 - q) is the weight of IBIS in the common long memory factor. The information share is for IBIS, the table reports the mean of





floor leads IBIS leads floor adjusts IBIS adjusts 1 - q mean range floor leads IBIS leads floor adjusts IBIS adjusts 1 - q mean range
D B K ++++ 0 . 7 2 6 0 . 7 9 1 0 . 2 5 6 ++++ 0 . 6 6 7 0 . 6 5 5 0 . 3 6 5
D A I ++++ 0 . 6 9 4 0 . 7 6 3 0 . 2 6 1 ++++ 0 . 8 8 6 0 . 8 9 3 0 . 1 7 9
S I E ++++ 0 . 6 6 5 0 . 7 2 5 0 . 2 6 9 ++++ 0 . 7 6 4 0 . 7 7 9 0 . 2 8 7
V O W ++++ 0 . 4 9 4 0 . 4 9 7 0 . 3 6 4 ++++ 0 . 6 3 6 0 . 6 2 4 0 . 4 2
A L V ++++ 0 . 4 7 6 0 . 5 2 5 0 . 2 6 8 ++++ 0 . 6 4 1 0 . 6 6 2 0 . 3 3 7
B A Y ++++ 0 . 5 3 0 . 5 4 5 0 . 3 3 ++++ 0 . 6 4 2 0 . 6 4 4 0 . 3 5 9
V E B ++++ 0 . 5 5 0 . 6 3 1 0 . 2 4 6 ++++ 0 . 6 8 2 0 . 7 2 5 0 . 2 6 5
B A S ++++ 0 . 5 8 0 . 6 0 9 0 . 2 3 7 ++++ 0 . 7 0 5 0 . 6 9 8 0 . 2 6 6
C O B ++++ 0 . 6 0 4 0 . 6 3 9 0 . 2 3 4 ++++ 0 . 6 0 4 0 . 5 8 3 0 . 3 2 2
H F A ++++ 0 . 6 4 1 0 . 7 3 4 0 . 2 0 8 ++++ 0 . 6 2 9 0 . 6 4 3 0 . 3 2 1
D T E ++++ 0 . 6 2 5 0 . 6 5 7 0 . 2 3 2 ++++ 0 . 6 8 2 0 . 6 8 0 . 3 2 6
D R B ++++ 0 . 5 4 0 . 5 7 4 0 . 2 1 4 ++++ 0 . 6 5 8 0 . 6 8 7 0 . 2 5 4
M M W ++++ 0 . 6 0 7 0 . 6 4 0 . 2 6 7 ++++ 0 . 6 8 5 0 . 6 9 4 0 . 3 1 7
S A P ++++ 0 . 5 1 2 0 . 5 3 6 0 . 2 2 4 ++++ 0 . 7 8 6 0 . 8 0 9 0 . 1 9 4
M U V ++++ 0 . 4 7 2 0 . 5 4 0 . 1 2 9 ++++ 0 . 7 4 3 0 . 8 3 8 0 . 1 2 1
B M W ++++ 0 . 5 5 4 0 . 6 3 1 0 . 1 7 3 ++++ 0 . 5 2 4 0 . 5 4 7 0 . 2 7 3
B V M ++++ 0 . 5 6 6 0 . 6 1 9 0 . 2 7 4 ++++ 0 . 7 9 5 0 . 8 3 4 0 . 1 8 9
B H W ++++ 0 . 5 1 2 0 . 5 5 7 0 . 1 1 2 ++++ 0 . 5 5 4 0 . 5 2 4 0 . 2 3 8
T H Y ++++ 0 . 6 0 2 0 . 6 5 5 0 . 1 8 6 ++++ 0 . 7 9 3 0 . 8 7 7 0 . 0 9 6
R W E ++++ 0 . 5 3 9 0 . 5 8 0 . 2 0 7 ++++ 0 . 6 0 8 0 . 6 3 6 0 . 2 1 7
S C H ++++ 0 . 3 9 1 0 . 3 2 3 0 . 1 5 1 ++++ 0 . 6 1 6 0 . 5 5 4 0 . 2 4
V I A ++++ 0 . 5 9 2 0 . 6 7 2 0 . 1 9 2 ++++ 0 . 5 7 8 0 . 5 7 9 0 . 2 3 5
M E O ++++ 0 . 4 7 8 0 . 5 6 5 0 . 1 2 8 ++++ 0 . 6 8 8 0 . 7 5 2 0 . 2 4 2
P R S ++++ 0 . 3 6 9 0 . 3 3 4 0 . 1 7 8 ++++ 0 . 5 5 5 0 . 5 1 5 0 . 2 5 7
L H A ++++ 0 . 5 0 3 0 . 5 4 3 0 . 2 5 9 ++++ 0 . 6 4 0 . 6 8 4 0 . 2 0 6
K A R ++++ 0 . 4 6 8 0 . 4 8 8 0 . 1 7 6 ++++ 0 . 5 8 9 0 . 5 5 6 0 . 1 8 7
D E G ++++ 0 . 4 4 2 0 . 4 4 2 0 . 1 3 ++++ 0 . 5 7 3 0 . 5 2 0 . 1 5 3
L I N ++++ 0 . 3 4 2 0 . 3 0 1 0 . 1 7 5 ++++ 0 . 4 0 . 3 6 0 . 1 7 2
H E N ++++ 0 . 4 8 7 0 . 5 3 6 0 . 0 6 4 ++++ 0 . 5 4 3 0 . 4 9 2 0 . 0 9 4
M A N ++++ 0 . 4 5 8 0 . 4 5 8 0 . 1 4 1 ++++ 0 . 5 9 8 0 . 5 9 2 0 . 1 1 6
error correction information share lead-lag relationship error correction information share lead-lag relationship
prices quote midpoints27
Table 3: Summary results of the error correction model – five minute intervals
A “+” indicates that the respective coefficient (error correction, lag coefficients in equations with one lag) or group of coefficients (lag coefficients in equations with more than one
lag) is significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. (1 - q) is the weight of IBIS in the common long memory factor. The information share is for IBIS, the table reports the mean of





floor leads IBIS leads floor adjusts IBIS adjusts 1 - q mean range floor leads IBIS leads floor adjusts IBIS adjusts 1 - q mean range
DBK + + + + 0.591 0.542 0.825 + + + + 0.406 0.48 0.889
DAI + + + + 0.592 0.542 0.818 + + + - 0.845 0.568 0.856
SIE + + + + 0.675 0.582 0.755 + + + - 0.952 0.621 0.756
VOW + + + + 0.424 0.474 0.802 + + + + 0.613 0.513 0.891
ALV + + + + 0.507 0.521 0.759 + + + + 0.758 0.58 0.802
BAY + + + + 0.455 0.489 0.792 + + + + 0.449 0.476 0.837
VEB + + + + 0.589 0.573 0.693 + + + + 0.784 0.626 0.713
BAS + + + + 0.552 0.518 0.732 + + + + 0.744 0.578 0.77
COB + + + + 0.641 0.575 0.716 + + + + 0.517 0.505 0.819
HFA + + + + 0.774 0.654 0.636 + + + + 0.611 0.525 0.838
DTE + + + + 0.593 0.569 0.67 + + + + 0.676 0.561 0.79
DRB + + + + 0.534 0.535 0.715 + + + - 0.714 0.589 0.75
MMW + + + + 0.423 0.459 0.715 + + + + 0.648 0.542 0.815
SAP + + + + 0.339 0.416 0.676 + + + + 0.754 0.599 0.751
MUV + + + + 0.5 0.517 0.549 + + + + 0.856 0.762 0.44
BMW + + + + 0.441 0.488 0.62 + + + + 0.489 0.507 0.694
BVM + + + + 0.593 0.58 0.667 + + + + 0.529 0.51 0.708
BHW + + + + 0.589 0.581 0.622 + + + + 0.555 0.512 0.71
THY + + + + 0.568 0.575 0.573 + + + + 0.818 0.784 0.369
RWE + + + + 0.533 0.543 0.558 + + + + 0.661 0.583 0.682
SCH + + + + 0.31 0.329 0.483 + + + + 0.574 0.509 0.717
VIA + + + + 0.523 0.553 0.506 + + + + 0.533 0.505 0.623
MEO + + + + 0.587 0.601 0.591 + + + - 0.942 0.723 0.549
PRS + + + + 0.266 0.329 0.522 + + + + 0.53 0.495 0.661
LHA + + + + 0.556 0.55 0.659 + + + + 0.7 0.614 0.66
KAR + + + + 0.526 0.538 0.55 + + + + 0.599 0.548 0.63
DEG + + + + 0.416 0.433 0.471 + + + + 0.584 0.54 0.491
LIN + + + + 0.349 0.354 0.446 + + + + 0.481 0.46 0.535
HEN + + + + 0.484 0.539 0.363 + + + + 0.559 0.537 0.429
MAN + + + + 0.464 0.468 0.407 + + + + 0.61 0.598 0.446
information share lead-lag relationship error correction information share lead-lag relationship error correction
prices quote midpoints28
Table 4: Information shares versus common factor weights
The table compares the information shares and the common factor weights. The common factor weights are for
IBIS. The information share is the mean of the lower and the upper bound for the IBIS information share. The
first two columns report the means for the four models. The third column gives the t statistic of a t-test of the null






equality of means correlation
1 minute, prices 0.534 0.570 1.32 0.972
1 minute, quote
midpoints
0.649 0.655 0.20 0.967
5 minutes, prices 0.513 0.514 0.04 0.947
5 minutes, quote
midpoints
0.650 0.565 2.84 0.83129
Table 5: Determinants of the contributions to price discovery
The table presents the results of regressions of the common factor weights for IBIS on a set of explanatory
variables. These are the IBIS market share in terms of DM trading volume, the difference between the effective
spreads in the two trading systems and the difference between the adverse selection components of the spreads. t-
values are given in parentheses.





















































































































































































































































Figure 4: Common factor weights: five-minute intervals
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